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ABSTRACT 
Typical problems that have a major impact on some 
space programs a r e  discussed. These problems include 
those that involve the interdependence of equipment in a 
system complex. 
The experiences obtained in producing reliable space- 
craft for several programs (Relay, Syncom, Tiros, etc.) are 
analyzed. The techniques used to control and appraise 
space programs differ and a r e  influenced by the spacecraft 
design, target dates, and budget restrictions. The validity 
of these techniques is indicated by the results of the test  
programs. Problem occurrences a r e  analyzed relative to 
program phase. The results of this study a r e  discussed 
with regard to optimizing techniques of quality and re- 
liability planning for space hardware. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL TEST CONTRIBUTION 
TO SPACECRAFT RELIABILITY * 
by 
Kenneth R. Mercy 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
INTRODUCTION 
Equipment used for  initial space exploration must be reliable if i t  is to meet the intended ob- 
jectives within a reasonable time and cost. Many ways of obtaining reliability, commonly used in 
the engineering and manufacturing fields, were found lacking in the perfection needed for  producing 
remote-controlled, unmanned spacecraft. Logistics also were an obstacle to reliability. Small 
quantities of materials, parts, and assemblies were obtained from widely-scattered sources around 
the world. Some of these items had to be developed for the special applications within the research 
laboratories. Traceability of material and the control of all items were not possible within the 
program plan. It was necessary to modify old techniques and introduce new ones. To achieve reli- 
ability, greater emphasis was placed on environmental testing. To meet this requirement, i t  was 
necessary to develop new and more sophisticated environmental facilities, which in turn demanded 
test procedures, involving new engineering approaches. The rapid growth of this effort embodied 
many people with specialized talents. Some of their far-removed and distant-related accomplish- 
ments were not known in the true perspective to the overall space program. A review of Goddard 
Space Flight Center's spacecraft history, including space programs such as Relay, Syncom and 
Tiros, is presented to show the contribution made by the environmental sciences. 
SPACECRAFT STRUCTURAL STRESSES 
A much discussed and often troublesome phase of environmental testing is the vibration test. 
This test is intended to add some level of confidence that the spacecraft can survive handling and 
launch s t r e s ses  without damage o r  degradation. From the stress-analyst viewpoint, vibration con- 
tributes some, but not all of the flight stress loads. The launch-vehicle thrust load plus loads due 
to wind conditions must be included. Thus, vibration testing of spacecraft involves a trade-off in 
the concept of launch simulation. In addition, the vibration tests a r e  conducted separately in three 
orthogonal directions, as compared with a combined effect applied in flight. Knowing the initial 
concepts, one must look deeper to understand fully the purpose, limitations, and intent of conduct- 
ing this test. 
*Presented a t  the annual technical meeting of the Institute of Environmental Sc iences  in Washington, D. C., April 11,  1967. 
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Figure 1 -Spacecraft  as a lumped mass v ibrat ion system. 
A typical spacecraft design, when analyzed 
by a vibration engineer, appears as an assembly 
of large and small masses, springs, and 
dampers. Figure 1 can be considered a sche- 
matic of a spacecraft as a lumped-mass vibra- 
tory system attached to a launch vehicle. The 
spacecraft is attached to the vehicle with 
massless springs and dampers. The vehicle 
itself is made up of masses, springs, and 
dampers. Similarly, the spacecraft appendages, 
subsystems, and components a re  shown. Thus, 
any part of the spacecraft (whether it be a box, 
a panel, a tank, o r  the internal parts of a 
transistor) can be idealized as a vibrating 
system. 
A vibration system will  respond to steady- 
state and random vibration; it will also be 
excited into resonance by shock excitation. The 
frequency response of each element o r  combination of elements will depend on the mass and its 
elastic members, in accordance with the basic vibration formula for resonant frequency: 
where 
f = resonant frequency, 
k = spring constant, and 
m = mass. 
Not only will a vibrating system be excited at the fundamental frequency, but additional resonant 
frequencies are possible for the higher modes of vibration. The higher structural modes and their 
resonant frequency can be illustrated by a free-free beam (Figure 2). As the frequency of excita- 
tion is increased beyond the fundamental resonance, another vibrating pattern o r  mode with its 
own resonant frequency appears. Increasing the frequency still further will create other resonances. 
Thus, a spacecraft with thousands of parts will  have many thousand possible resonant frequencies 
within the launch-vehicle excitation range. 
The most important aspect of the vibration problem is the resultant s t resses  at these resonant 
frequencies. At resonance, the amplitude of the elastic member exceeds the amplitude of the ad- 
jacent structure by a factor which is limited by the damping of the material o r  the applied damping. 
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RESONANT 
FREQUENCY = f 
The basic s t ress  level is directly related to the vibration 
amplitudes. The s t r e s s  vs  frequency will  be similar to that 
in Figure 3, which shows light and heavy damping. 
If the damping for each vibrating system does not keep 
dynamic s t resses  within the fatigue limitations of the ma- , 2 N D  MODE 
RESONANT 
FREQUENCY = 2.7 f 
terial, failure will occur. The fatigue life of some materials 
used in spacecraft construction is shown in Figure 4. 
The acceptable s t r e s s  level will depend on the number 
of s t ress  cycles and the amplitude experienced during the 
3RD MODE 
RESONANT 
FREQUENCY = 5.4 f life of the spacecraft o r  its component parts. Some part o r  
segment of the structure with low resonant frequencies may 
experience only a few hundredcycles, in comparison to over 
a million cycles for those with higher resonant frequencies. 
In some cases, fatigue life can be an important factor. For  example, if solder is used as a s t ress  
element, a fatigue failure may occur. Compared with steel, for instance, solder has a low fatigue 
limit; it will  not survive many cycles at low stresses. (See Figure 4.) 
Figure 2-Vibration modes of 
a free-free beam. 
The ultimate strength of the materials will  
be different if vibratory loads are applied by 
themselves, o r  in combination with steady-state 
loads. One of the tools that the designer uses to 
equate these differences is the Goodman-type 
diagram. (See Figure 5.) This diagram indicates 
that the ultimate strength of the material for a 
vibratory s t r e s s  alone is only one-third (G-"). 
This level would represent lateral dynamic loads 
on a spacecraft during flight without shear wind 
loads. It would also be applicable to the space- 
craft during tes t  in any direction. 
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Figure 3-Stress vs frequency. Figure 4-Fatigue life of materials. 
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Figure 5-Goodman diagram to determine acceptable ma- 
terial stresses for cdmbined steady and dynamic stresses. 
For  a spacecraft in flight, the static loads 
in the thrust direction would normally be rep- 
resented on the Goodman chart  at some level 
where there would be fluctuating stresses, but 
no s t r e s s  reversal. Thus, higher s t r e s ses  
could be tolerated before failure occurs. Ob- 
viously our present-day vibration testing tech- 
niques cannot give exact simulation of the ma- 
terial stresses.  A typical flight-acceleration 
record for a Thor-Agena launch (Figure 6) shows 
the type of static and dynamic loads that exists on 
some launches. These records were taken at  the 
Agena interface with the spacecraft adapter for 
a 1000-pound spacecraft. The peak amplitudes 
o r  resultant s t resses  exist for a very few seconds 
The steady-state vehicle acceleration can be 
noted in the thrust-axis record; it can equal or  exceed the dynamic component. The vibration wave 
is complex at the beginning with major dynamic loads occurring at frequencies of 15, 40, and 79 Hz 
during lift-off, followed by frequencies in the range of 0 to 25 Hz at trans-sonic speed. Just  before 
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Figure 6-Spacecraft acceleration and vibration during flight. 
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burnout of the first stage, there is a strong 18-Hz resonant frequency. Other frequencies range 
from 17 Hz at vernier-engine cutoff to 152 Hz at Agena cutoff. Higher frequencies are present, but 
a r e  not shown on this instrumentation record. The peak loads occur for less than a minute, and at 
the lower frequencies. The resultant stresses throughout the spacecraft are usually not known be- 
cause of unknown damping coefficients and the phase relationship between the structural elements, 
except where studies and measurements are made for a specific condition. 
Thus, those knowledgeable of the many indeterminate factors involved sometimes wonder 
whether the testing is beneficial o r  harmful. Because of the complexity of the unmanned spacecraft, 
the emphasis has been on vibration testing of the complete spacecraft. In each program, a proto- 
type spacecraft is subjected to test  levels 50 percent higher than those for the flight model, to en- 
sure  a margin of safety in the design. New programs also have the advantage of studying the re- 
sponse of a simulated loaded spacecraft structure (an engineering model) to the prototype levels. 
Structural problems o r  potential high-stress areas are  usually uncovered with this model and cor- 
rected before the prototype and flight-model tests. Figure 7 shows the number of significant prob- 
lems encountered in some typical programs during vibration tes ts  of the flight model spacecrafts; 
the figure shows the number of significant launch-related problems encountered in flight for  the 
same spacecrafts. 
The number of problems occurring at the system level of test reaffirms the difficulty of fully 
understanding the dynamic environment. The adequacy of the tests is indicated by the good per- 
formance of the spacecraft after launch. Whether or not the vibration tests are forcing the 
designer to ruggedize his design beyond a reasonable safety limit will always be debatable. 
The types of test problem encountered after vibration tests on the prototype and flight model 
spacecraft are listed in Table 1. The majority of these items would have severely degraded the per- 
formance of the spacecraft. The problems oc- 
c u r  at any level of assembly and in any part  of 
the spacecraft. The failure mode appears to be 
the result of localized resonant condition with 
very little damping present. Thus, the problems 
may be classedas subtle vibration design prob- 
lems that can easily be influenced by variations 
in fabrication and assembly procedures. 
It is apparent that the vibration-related 
problems indicated are not easily detected be- 
fore testing. Designing a spacecraft to cope 
with the potential p r o b  1 e m s has been good, 
otherwise many more problems would be noted. 
In one spacecraft, an overhanging delicate box 
assembly was noted to have transmissibilities 
of the order  of 12X. By careful study and the 
design of a coulomb damper strut, this vibra- 
tion environment was reduced 50 percent. 
a .  SPACECRAFT VIBRATION 
TEST RESULTS 
A B C D E F G  
b. SPACECRAFT PROBLEMS 
(probably launch related) 
DURING 0 1 0  7 DAYS 
OF FLIGHT 
Figure 7-Vibration acceptance test results vs 
flight experience. 
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Table 1 
Defective 
component 
or  subsystem 
Vibration Design Problems Noted after Spacecraft Vibration Tests. 
Problems 
Flight 
model model 
Prototype 
Command receiver Reduced sensitivity 
caused by a damaged 
zener diode 
I I Experiment package Mounting flange fractured I 
Cracked terminal 
seal in transformer 
caused oil leak 
Power supply Broken solder joint 
because of taut wire 
t Battery cell 
Beacon transmitter 
Charge controller 
Clock circuit 
I Telemetry transmitter 
(1) Reduced output 
(2) Failure of transmitter; 
vibration transmissibility 
was excessive (about 16X) 
Broken wire 
Leaky transistor 
Despin mechanism 
Internal connection 
failed 
Weight dropped off 
(1) Internal connection failed 
(2) Cell became shorted 
(1) Cracked coil reduced 
(2) Degraded vacuum tube 
power output by 50 percent 
caused output to vary 
I Camera I (1) Lens rotated in mounting (2) Shutter moved out of place 
I Recorder I Magnetic tape came off capstan and jammed recorder 
Large solar paddles a r e  always potential trouble areas.  Studies for one spacecraft showed 
vibration modes of panels in conflict with the spacecraft structure. Attachment s t resses  were high 
enough to cause failure. Decoupling techniques were successfully applied before final system tests 
and flight. 
THERMAL FACTORS 
Unmanned spacecraft have varied considerably in the methods employed to establish a thermal 
base for  the subsystems and instrument packages. In a vacuum, the heat flow from hot bodies to 
cold bodies must be by radiation and conduction without convection. The restricted heat flow can 
cause localized high temperatures that can damage thermally sensitive components. Also, 
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components can be damaged by the extreme cold encountered in the earth's shadow. Thermal con- 
t rol  of major zones of a spacecraft has been made possible by either a passive o r  active design. 
Passive controls a r e  simple and use the physical characteristics, absorptivity, and emissivity of 
the surface coatings. Active controls are devices that alter the rate of heat flow from the surfaces, 
to other par ts  of the spacecraft o r  to outer space. The complexity of the thermal design can best 
be understood by enumerating the basic factors involved. These are as follows: 
Solar Orbit 
Intensity 
Spectrum 
Space craft 
Sun aspect angle 
Spin- stabilized 
Attitude controls 
Spacecraft 
Thermal Control 
Active 
Passive 
Absorptivity 
Percent sun 
Earth's shadow 
Period 
Earth albedo 
Earth shine 
Spacecraft Materials 
Thermal conductance of material 
Thermal conductance of joints 
Pressurized compo- 
nents of spacecraft 
Degradation of 
materials in space 
Spacecraft Operation 
Emissivity Internal heat 
Angle of incidence generators 
Heat sinks Operation cycle 
The thermal design must be considered as part  of a system, since it involves many factors 
interrelated with other disciplines. Some of the thermal approaches conflict with the overall space- 
craft design. For example, the best thermal conductance joint design would not dampen the space- 
craft structure enough to reduce the vibratory stress loads. In cases where surfaces a r e  electri- 
cally insulated, the thermal conductance properties are poor. 
Many spacecraft have thermal characteristics that can cause catastrophic failure i f  uncon- 
trolled. Thermal analyses without supporting tests would not provide the accuracy needed in these 
critical areas. A system test  of the complete spacecraft is essential to give confidence before 
launch. But there are many ways of conducting these tests. Some may distort the thermal gradients 
and prevent a thorough evaluation. Solar-simulation vacuum tests offer the best approach; but 
their complexity, high cost, and other factors often prohibit them. Thermal-soak type tests, which 
are less  costly, must be carefully controlled to prevent damage to some components. In one major 
program, an off-the-shelf battery cell not designed to be operated at the spacecraft temperature 
level encountered in a thermal-soak test was used over very limited temperature range. Due to 
higher spacecraft test  temperatures expected, a trade-off in test procedures was necessary which 
reduced somewhat the advantages of full system tests. 
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SPACECRAFT ORBITS 
1') A--, 0 
SHADOW 
Spocecroft 
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SPACECRAFT FLIGHT DATA 
THERMAL RANGE 'C 
Solar Stabilization Thermal Internal Batteries 
control structure 
Spin Active -3 to 27 -3 to 26 -42 to 12 
Spin Passive -7 to 26 
Spin Passive 2 to 26 5 to 35 2 to 82 
4 Spin Passive -88* to 45 -44* to 44 -- to 14 
Figure 8-Flight thermal data. 
The tes t  temperatures are based on the 
extremes expected during flight, with prototype 
spacecraft subjected to an additional 10 to 15°C 
margin. Spacecraft thermal data f rom telemeti 
records have shown low and high temperature 
extremes of -88°C and +82"C, respectively (see 
Figure 8). The extreme cold conditions have 
been experienced for spacecraft which, at some 
seasonal time, spend considerable percentage 
of their orbit period in the earth's shadow. In 
general, the basic instrument package in a 
nominal orbit is kept at habitable temperatures. 
Since the spacecraft are considered ready 
for flight when they reach the system environ- 
mental tests, good performance without f a i l -  
u r e s  is expected. Experience has shown that 
this level of perfection is uncommon, and many 
problems a r e  uncovered at this time. Table 2 
shows a compilation of thermally related prob- 
lems noted during environmental tests on the 
Table 2 
Thermal-Vacuum Related Problems Noted During Spacecraft Environmental Tests. 
Defective 
component 
or  subsystem 
Wideband subsystem 
Clock oscillator 
Solar cells 
Problems 
Prototype 
model 
(1) Transponder mal- 
functioned during cold 
phase, requiring 
replacement of a 
2N1405 transistor 
(2) TWT experienced helix 
current runaway during 
cold phase requiring 
replacement of the tube 
Low output during 50°C 
thermal-vacuum, requiring 
change of design and addition 
of thermal insulation 
Flight 
model 
Physical degradation 
during solar vacuum of 
bond between cell and 
cover 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Defective 
component 
o r  subsystem 
Problems 
Prototype Flight 
model model 
(1) Picture lost syn- 
chronization during 
cold phase 
( 2 )  Unwanted pulse trig- 
gered shutter circuit 
No. 1 recorder 
No. 2 recorder 
Low -f requency beacon 
Magnetic tape disengaged 
during cold phase 
Magnetic tape disengaged 
during hot phase 
Lost 40db in output level 
during 50°C hot phase, re- 
covered at  27°C 
I Beacon subcarrier oscillator I Would not function at I 0°C 
Power converter Experienced thermal 
runaway at 50°C 
prototype and flight model spacecraft. These problems can be considered typical for the unmanned 
spacecraft. There is a wide variety of problem types which involve materials and their sensitivity 
to small o r  extreme changes in temperature. 
Variation in electrical characteristics in a 
system complex is difficult to anticipate, es- 
pecially when some items have no past history. 
No one technique o r  control can prevent these 
malfunctions, but a balancedprogram approach 
backed up by environmental tests is necessary. 
A comparison of thermal test  results with 
flight history is presented in Figure 9. The 
results of flight operations for the first 30 
days showed 4 of 7 spacecraft experiencing 
possible thermal problems. The many prob- 
lems noted both in test and flight emphasize 
the need f o r  a good thermal-vacuum system 
test. 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
1 
I SYSTEM INTERACTIONS 
1 
, A spacecraft problem can involve not only 
one environmental parameter but many pro- 
fessional disciplines. Designs and assemblies 
m 
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b. SPACECRAFT PROBLEMS DURING 
0 - 30 DAYS IN ORBIT 
Figure 9-Thermal-vacuum test results vs 
f l i g h t  experience.  
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of individual items good by themselves can give unexpected trouble when taken together. Electrical, 
chemical, materials, thermal, vacuum, vibration, fabrication, and procurement factors can interact 
in one troublesome area. 
Electrical-Thermal-Chemical-Pressure 
The space programs were accelerated by using as many off-the-shelf items as possible. The 
procurement of rechargeable NiCd batteries was one of the important items of this category. The 
relatively small orders  for spacecraft made it necessary to accept the manufacturer's time scale 
for his normal production runs. Thus, the long-lead time and lengthy spacecraft schedules intro- 
duced shelf life as an important environmental factor. Battery cell leakage was encountered. This 
deficiency alone resulted in a chain reaction of problems. A leaky cell causes a battery pack to be 
electrically unbalanced, followed by excessive charge rates per  cell, gas  generation, pressure 
buildup, case distortion, and fracture of thermal-conducting path in spacecraft. 
When batteries were subjected to vibration, sometimes the internal electrical connections were 
broken. Investigation revealed that the internal electrical connection in the battery cell was ac- 
complished by a blind weld. Quality-control of this operation to determine if a satisfactory weld 
was made for vibratory stresses was difficult and almost impossible. 
Batteries had limited temperature range, especially when cellulose acetate separators were 
used. Batteries created their own thermal loads and required a good spacecraft system thermal 
design to dissipate the heat loads in a vacuum environment. Thermal-vacuum testing of a complete 
operating spacecraft was found to overstress the batteries at the prescribed hot-soak temperatures. 
Test  program trade-offs were found necessary to circumvent the problem. The manufacturer in- 
dicated that the battery cell separators disintegrated above 35"C, while spacecraft tests were re- 
quired at 50°C. Attempts to increase battery temperature limits with polypropylene separators 
early in the space program created other problems. Development time is not always predictable 
in many phases of the space programs. 
Other thermal interfaces required the spacecraft designer to develop electrical-insulatindheat- 
transfer cements to conduct heat from battery casings to the spacecraft structure without electri- 
cally grounding the battery case. Solar simulation and thermal-gradient type test were necessary 
to help resolve th is  localized thermal problem. Vibration tests also were necessary, as indicated 
by failures of the spacecraft thermal joints. 
Battery operation generates heat which must be removed to prevent excessive temperatures. 
A shorted battery cell o r  an overcharged condition amplifies this condition. Cell temperature use 
leads to gas generation and catastrophic internal pressures.  To prevent spacecraft damage, elec- 
trical and pressure-protective devices are incorporated in the spacecraft system design. The real  
solution of this problem is the coordination of the efforts of many people (the battery supplier, the 
spacecraft designer, the thermal engineer, the vibration engineer, the test operations, etc.) to 
resolve the technical interfaces early in the program. 
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Electrical-Ma terial-Corona-Vacuum-Thermal-Vibration 
The battery problem is not unique, but is representative of many spacecraft problem areas. 
Another significant interface item is the traveling-wave tube (TWT) used in a communications 
spacecraft. This high-power tube (10 watts) was i n  the final stages of development at the time that 
it was needed for  the spacecraft. With only a few specimens available, it was necessary to resolve 
the critical vibration and thermal interfaces. The delicate construction of the tube forced the space- 
craft  designer to incorporate a vibration-isolator type mounting. This mounting, in turn, obstructed 
the thermal-conduction path for the high-heat load (50 watts). The tube design required that the 
collector temperature be maintained below 180°C. A separate heat sink was found necessary; in 
order to conserve weight, the final design used a remote part  of the spacecraft structure for this 
purpose. A braided copper thermal conductor satisfied this unusual requirement. The heat load 
was also related to the spacecraft operating cycle. Operation was required during the period of 
mutual visibility between ground stations on two continents; thus, a cooling-off period during part  
of the orbit was possible. The environmental systems tests were important in proving that the 
communications subsystem could meet its space objectives. The large thermal gradients emphasized 
the need for the more realistic solar  simulation-vacuum tests. 
Before the system test, a thermal-vacuum subsystem test of the TWT revealed a serious de- 
ficiency in the tube construction. Investigation uncovered an arcover condition in the highly pre- 
cise, small feed-through fitting of the tube. Material, fabrication procedures, and seal design had 
to be reworked. Although recovery operation was time-consuming and costly, the detection of this 
deficiency at the subsystem level prevented more costly delays at the system level. 
Corona or high-voltage arcover of electrical circuits as indicated in the TWT tests is a common 
spacecraft condition, but is difficult to diagnose and prevent. Since most of the spacecraft high 
voltage elements are not observable during test  and some elements are deeply buried in potted 
materials, corona can only be detected by noting the spacecraft electrical performance. Other 
electrical problems o r  simplified t e s t  procedures can make these observations difficult. In some 
cases, catastrophic failures have occurred. Vacuum testing is one of the important tools in de- 
tecting to detect corona. High voltage at gas pressures of 10 to t o r r  will  accentuate this con- 
dition. Insulation materials, outgassing of materials, material changes with temperature, sharp 
edges, and the vibration environment can also help produce corona. The vagueness that surrounds 
this problem emphasizes the importance of environmental tests. 
Electrical Materials, Thermal Vacuum 
Another spacecraft problem resulted in a catastrophic power failure that could be attributed 
to materials, heat, vacuum, and the passage of time. A high-power 2N665 transistor in the charge- 
controller circuit was mounted on a Berlox pad to provide electrical insulation. A thin sheet of 
indium improved the thermal-conducting path between the Berlox and the spacecraft mounting. 
After 56 hours of exposure to maximum flight temperatures during a solar-vacuum test, the indium 
had flowed enough to cause a short-circuit between the spacecraft and the transistor terminal. This 
apparently minor defect in design would have had serious effects in orbit. 
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ELECTRICAL AND ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE 
The spacecraft designs (which are a collection of many different types of electrical, electronic, 
and electro-mechanical devices) have been plagued with interference problems. Some have orig- 
inated internally, and some have been rf of the space environment. The internal problems have 
been either power line surges, due to various component operations, or rf generated-which affects 
other sensitive circuits. Typical examples of flight experiences a r e  as follows: 
1. Command subsystem has operated by internal or external rf signal from an unknown source. 
2. Camera shutters have operated at the improper spacecraft attitude. 
3. Camera shutters have generated electrical signals on impacting stops as noted on video 
4. Circuit noise levels have reduced signal level to marginal operating conditions. 
output. 
Environmental test  techniques for detecting the causes of interference have been improving 
over the years, but the more complex spacecraft makes it difficult to perform all the possible 
combinations of operating modes for changes of environment. Environmental facilities like thermal- 
vacuum chambers a re  not conducive to rf studies. Thus, careful test planning using other tech- 
niques is essential to ensure that the interference problem has been adequately covered. 
MAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT 
The magnetic fields generated within a spacecraft and interaction with the earth's magnetic 
field a r e  important test considerations. In order that scientific measurements can be made with 
magnetometers, the ambient magnetic field of the spacecraft must be controlled to prevent inter- 
ference similar to the electromagnetic interference previously discussed. The choice of spacecraft 
materials, shielding, and electrical fields are studied in magnetic fields that neutralize the earth 
and man-made fields. 
The influence of the earth's field on the orbiting spacecraft can create a magnetic moment 
which changes the attitude of the spacecraft. This condition must also be studied so that the mag- 
netic moments can be neutralized. In some cases, spacecraft have incorporated a controlled mag- 
netic moment to obtain attitude corrections. Thus, the magnetic environmental test  plays an im- 
portant par t  in the unmanned spacecraft program. 
PROBLEM ANALYSES 
The environmental test program for GSFC unmanned spacecraft has uncovered a variety of 
problems. If perfect technique could be employed from design, selection of materials, fabrication, 
and assembly, no malfunctions would occur at the systems test  level. Unfortunately, the small  
quantities of parts and materials required for a program and the experimental nature of some of the 
assemblies used have not permitted the usual production controls and quality assurance to be fully 
employed. To compensate for this program deficiency, considerable effort has been expended in 
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providing engineering reviews of design, fabrication, and test. The effectiveness of this approach 
is shown by a problem analysis of a typical program. 
The number of significant problems encountered in different environments by the prototype and 
flight model spacecraft is shown in Figure 10. Of the 52 prototype-model problems, 30 were un- 
covered by environmental test, with vibration accounting for the majority. The flight model en- 
countered 17 problems, 10 of which were related to environment. 
A further study of the type of problems encountered during the environmental test is shown in 
Figure 11. As expected, the design qualification tests of the prototype model uncovered 18 design 
problems, nine of which would have been catastrophic in flight. The flight model had two design 
problems-both of which would have been catastrophic. This confirms the philosophy that testing 
the flight model as a complete system is important. 
Quality control problems were significant for both the prototype and flight models. A large 
percentage of these were catastrophic, but it must be noted that the elimination of quality control 
problems by themselves would not be sufficient to assure a successful program. 
The history of the flight model spacecraft in orbit indicates that the program was successful. 
A serious deficiency was  noted in the power supply after launch, but fortunately this circuit was 
redundant. The deficiency was a temperature-related transistor malfunction which was  previously 
noted during prototype model environmental testing. It w a s  diagnosed as a defective part. A more 
precise analysis would have revealed a design-fabrication factor interacting with a cold thermal 
environment. 
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Figure 10-Spacecraft environmental related problems. 
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Another flight problem involved the command subsystem. Rf interference caused a sporadic 
change of spacecraft operating state. Although troublesome, it did not affect the overall program. 
This condition was not detected during testing: the rf orbit environments were not known. The need 
for greater emphasis on interference testing was indicated by the experience in this program. 
The spacecraft encountered a problem with its one-year cutoff timer. This electrochemical 
device failed to operate at the one-year time limit o r  anytime thereafter. A device of this type 
needs more test history before its reliability can be established. 
SPACE PROGRAM RESULTS 100 1 1 
The test philosophy and techniques fol- 
lowed in the Goddard programs differ in some 
respects; but, in general, a major emphasis is 
placed on full-scale systems testing of the 
prototype and the flight spacecraft. The re- 
sults are indicated by the data obtained from 
49 launches during the years 1960 through 
1966. A total of 251 experiments were flown 
(see Figure 12) .  Sixty-three percent met the 
mission objectives as  planned; an additional 30 
percent obtained useful data, although ab- 
normal conditions were present. A total of 93- 
percent success for this ever-changing space 
technology is a fine achievement. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The unmanned spacecraft programs have 
used material and parts from many widely 
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Figure 12-Flight experience of GSFC spacecroft 
from 1960 to 1966. 
scattered sources that have not been amenable to the engineering control necessary to assure high 
reliability. In addition, the complexity of the design and the unknowns relative to dynamic, thermal, 
and other environments have prevented precise engineering analyses to be performed within the 
scope of the programs. Program objectives, in view of these obstacles, have been reached by plac- 
have uncovered many hidden problem areas  that could have caused loss of scientific data. 
I 
I 
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ing greater emphasis on simulated environmental testing of the completed spacecraft. The tests 
Test and flight results have shown that the many facets of producing a spacecraft interact in 
such a manner that i t  is difficult to attribute reliability to any one factor. Optimizing techniques 
for  space programs, based on past experience, are needed if  reliability is to be achieved within 
the restrictions of time and cost. 
I 
I 
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